Reinsurance Focus

The Ninth Circuit recently issued an opinion on an issue of first impression — whether an order compelling enforcement of a contractual agreement to submit a dispute to a referee, and staying proceedings in the interim, is immediately appealable. The dispute at issue arose between Bagdasarian Productions and Twentieth Century Fox over the film “Alvin and the Chipmunks, The Squeakquel.” The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings. Specifically, the court held that the stay was not a “final decision” or “judgment” because it did not put the plaintiffs “out of court.” No decision by the referee could possibly moot the action or be res judicata (as with a parallel proceeding). Indeed, after the referee’s decision, the losing party would have the option of moving for a new trial or any other post-judgment motions. Similarly, the court found that the order staying the proceedings was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because plaintiffs could ultimately seek relief on appeal to this court after the action before the referee and district court concludes. The Court noted that its ruling was consistent with treatment of orders denying or compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. Bagdasarian Productions, LLC v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., No. 10-56430 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2012).

This post written by John Black.

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Liberty Travel (and affiliated travel and leisure companies) and Travel Re-Insurance filed cross-motions for summary judgment on a dispute related in part to reinsurance of travel insurance products sold by Liberty to its customers. Liberty and Travel Re’s relationship was complex, and involved both reinsurance and direct insurance. Among other things, Travel Re contracted with Liberty to be its exclusive provider of travel insurance products. Essentially, Travel Re provided reinsurance on travel products, and would also collect “Salvage” from Liberty, meaning the excess money collected when a travel supplier did not issue a cancellation penalty or issued a credit or reimbursement to Liberty following a customer’s trip cancellation. After some time, Liberty sought to end the parties’ exclusive arrangement, and Travel Re filed suit.

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted in part Liberty’s motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that (a) Liberty was not liable for damages unforeseeable at the time the contract was entered; (b) the existence of a valid contract barred Travel Re’s claim for unjust enrichment; and (c) Travel Re’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be dismissed as duplicative of the breach of contract claim. The court, however, denied summary judgment as to the breach of contract and also ruled that material issues of fact remained as to whether Travel Re mitigated damages. Finally, the court denied Travel Re’s motion for summary judgment on the exclusivity provision, finding issues of fact as to who was to blame for the failure to engage in a joint determination of reasonable competitiveness under the contract. Travel Re-Insurance Partners, Ltd. v. Liberty Travel, Inc., No. 09-CV-5033 (D. N.J. May 9, 2012).

This post written by John Black.

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A hospital sued its bond insurer and reinsurer for losses incurred pre-paying certain debt before learning that the insurers would refuse to consent to the hospital’s plan to procure additional debt to fund a new facility. The hospital contended that the underlying policy implicitly required the insurer and reinsurer to provide consent to additional loans if the hospital complied with the policy’s “additional debt test” standards, with which the hospital allegedly complied. The court disagreed and dismissed the case, holding that the policy provided an unqualified right to the insurers to withhold consent. The consent provisions were unconditional on their face and, moreover, contained in a section of the policy separate from the debt test provisions. The court further held that the hospital’s allegations of improper motives on the part of the insurers should be dismissed, where the insurers purportedly withheld consent to conduct diligence on what was to be a $350 million bond offering deal. Woman’s Hospital Foundation v. National Public Finance Guarantee Corp., Case No. 11-cv-00014 (USDC M.D. La. Mar. 20, 2012).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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Arch Reinsurance Company entered into a three-party agreement with a homeowners insurer and insurance agent, Underwriters Service Agency, under which Arch agreed to reinsure all of the risk associated with the underlying insurance policies, and Underwriters agreed to accept commissions based on the extent of the losses taken on the policies. During the agreement’s term, an Arch representative, who subsequently resigned, agreed with Underwriters to amend the reinsurance agreement to raise the minimum commission available to Underwriters by “capping” Arch’s reinsurance at a specified amount of loss.

When Arch’s chairman belatedly learned of the amendment, he unsuccessfully attempted to revoke it, and then sued Underwriters, contending that the amendment was void for want of the cedent insurer’s consent. After a jury verdict was entered in Underwriters’s favor, the appellate court affirmed, holding the reinsurance agreement could be amended even without the consent of the cedent insurer. Despite language in the agreement and state law requiring the insurer’s consent, the court held that a modification could stand if it did not materially affect the cedent insurer. Arch’s apparent agreement to “cap” the insurer’s reinsurance coverage notwithstanding, an indemnity provision in Underwriters’s agency agreement could be construed to permit the insurer to continue to seek unlimited reinsurance coverage from Arch, who could then, in turn, seek indemnity from Underwriters for losses above the cap. The insurer’s status quo was preserved, the amendment would not shift any risk back to the insurer, and the modification would stand. Arch Reinsurance Co. v. Underwriters Service Agency, Inc., Case No. 02-10-00365-CV (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2012).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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Land O’ Lakes, a member-owned agricultural cooperative, acquired a property in Oklahoma that was later designated by the EPA as a “Superfund” clean-up site. In or about 2001, the EPA notified Land O’ Lakes that it was a Potentially Responsible Party (“PRP”) for the clean-up costs, and demanded $8.9 million. Land O’ Lakes notified its insurers, who declined coverage. In or about 2008, the EPA sent a renewed notice to Land O’ Lakes, demanding more than $20 million in additional clean-up costs. Land O’ Lakes again turned to its insurers and all declined coverage. Land O’ Lakes sued and all issues were raised via cross motions for summary judgment, with all parties seeking judgment in their favor. While the majority of this opinion addresses the direct claims by Land O’ Lakes against its insurers, the Court granted summary judgment to White Mountains Reinsurance on contribution claims asserted against it by Travelers Indemnity and Employers Insurance Company of Wausau. Summary judgment was predicated upon alternative grounds, the most basic of which was that although Travelers and Wausau breached their duty to defend Land O’ Lakes, that claim, upon which the claim of contribution was based, was barred by the statute of limitation. Land O’ Lakes, Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, Case No. 09-CV-0693, (USDC D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2012).

This post written by John Pitblado.

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After settling with AIG for $1 billion, the New York Attorney General remains in pursuit of two former AIG executives—former CEO Maurice “Hank” Greenberg and former CFO Howard Smith—in connection with their alleged roles in a finite reinsurance transaction between AIG and Gen Re and a transaction between AIG and Capco Reinsurance Company, an offshore shell company that AIG allegedly used to disguise unfavorable loss ratios from the investing public. The appellate court affirmed the denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the AG’s claims, which are brought under New York’s Martin Act and Executive Law section 62(12). The appellate court held that the claims are not preempted by federal securities laws and that triable issues exist based on the record evidence. The court also reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the AG on liability with respect to the Capco transaction. State of New York v. Greenberg, No. 401720/05 (N.Y. App. Div. May 8, 2012).

This post written by Ben Seessel.

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Policyholder Nero filed a putative class action lawsuit against American Family Insurance Company, alleging common law and statutory claims. American Family moved to dismiss, asserting that the claims were subject to mandatory arbitration, among other grounds. Shortly thereafter, on March 1, Nero notified American Family that an arbitration hearing would be commencing on March 5 in a different state and in front of a single arbitrator. American Family sought a temporary restraining order from the court enjoining the arbitration. American Family argued that it did not have sufficient time to prepare and, furthermore, that the location and designation of a single arbitrator was contrary to the terms of the arbitration provision in Nero’s insurance policy. It further argued that it would be irreparably harmed by having to “oppose confirmation of an unjust arbitration award” in a different jurisdiction. The court denied American Family’s request. The court stated that American Family’s contention that the arbitrator would not follow the proper procedure for selecting arbitrators was only speculative, and, furthermore, that FAA section 10(a)(3) permits vacatur where an arbitrator wrongfully refuses to postpone an arbitration hearing. Nero v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., Case No. 11-02717 (USDC D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2012).

This post written by Ben Seessel.

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Plaintiff sued her bank in Florida federal court for the manner in which she was charged overdraft fees. The bank moved to compel arbitration, but the district court found the agreement to arbitrate unconscionable and unenforceable. The bank appealed. After the Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011), the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration in light thereof. The district court again refused to compel arbitration, avoiding an unconscionability finding, but nevertheless finding that the dispute did not come within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The bank again appealed and the Eleventh Circuit again reversed, finding the threshold issue of whether the dispute is arbitrable to be explicitly reserved for the arbitrator under the so-called “delegation provision” in the parties’ contract, which states that “[a]ny issue regarding whether a particular dispute or controversy is . . . subject to arbitration will be decided by the arbitrator.” In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, No. 11-14282 (11th Cir. March 21, 2012).

This post written by John Pitblado.

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On March 27th and April 24th, respectively, Oregon and Florida became the latest states to enact legislation providing for the formation of captive insurers, including captive reinsurers, for various types of insurance. Among other things, the new legislation sets out standards for captive formation, capitalization requirements, permissible types of coverage, and reporting. The two laws vary, however, in several respects.

Oregon’s new law (SB 1547) requires minimum policyholder surplus of between $250,000 and $750,000, depending on whether the captive is formed as a “pure” captive, “association” captive, or captive reinsurer, all of which (among others) are defined in the law. Florida’s law (HB 1101), in contrast, requires minimum surplus of between $250,000 and $500,000, depending on whether the captive is formed as a “pure” captive, or an “industrial insured” captive, as defined therein.

The new laws also differ with respect to fees and taxes. Oregon requires $5,000 for the initial application fee and $5,000 for each annual renewal, whereas Florida requires $1,500 as an application fee and $1,000 for annual renewal. With respect to premium taxes, Oregon’s law contains none, as opposed to Florida’s law which sets a premium tax rate of 1.75% on gross premium receipts. Both laws provide various financial requirements relating to the maintenance of reserves and liquidity.

Captives licensed in Oregon or Florida are required to have at least one board meeting each year in their respective states. Both states also require captives to maintain their respective principal places of business in-state (with one exception in Oregon’s law for “branch” captives). Approximately 31 jurisdictions have now enacted captive insurance laws over the past decade. Both the Oregon and Florida laws will take effect July 1, 2012.

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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School districts brought a case in state court against their insurers, alleging that the insurers’ withdrawal of funds from the federal Early Retiree Reinsurance Program (ERRP) on the school district’s behalf was improper under the ERRP’s scheme. Despite the plaintiffs’ assertion of only state common law claims for conversion, civil theft, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty, the defendants removed the case to federal court as implicating a federal question. On plaintiffs’ motion to remand back to state court, the court analyzed plaintiffs’ allegations and determined that, notwithstanding that the legal claims were alleged under state law, meeting the elements of those claims required the court to interpret the ERRP and related federal regulations to determine whether the defendants’ withdrawals were proper. The court then determined that, because the case would entail a “substantial and disputed federal issue,” and because federal jurisdiction over the case would not create “a potentially enormous shift of traditionally state cases into federal court,” federal jurisdiction was proper. In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the lack of a right to a private right of action under the ERRP was a relevant factor, but did not require remand. Hartland Lakeside Joint No. 3 School District v. WEA Insurance Corp., Case No. 2:12-cv-00154 (USDC E.D. Wisc. Apr. 24, 2012).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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