06-0325-cv District Council 1707 v. Hope Day Nursery, Inc.

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

3 SUMMARY ORDER

4 RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS FILED 5 AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 0.23 AND 6 FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A BRIEF OR OTHER PAPER IN WHICH A LITIGANT 7 CITES A SUMMARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST ONE CITATION 8 MUST EITHER BE TO THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE NOTATION: "(SUMMARY ORDER)." 9 UNLESS THE SUMMARY ORDER IS AVAILABLE IN AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE WHICH IS PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE 10 WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEE (SUCH AS THE DATABASE AVAILABLE AT HTTP://www.ca2.uscourts.gov), THE 11 PARTY CITING THE SUMMARY ORDER MUST FILE AND SERVE A COPY OF THAT SUMMARY ORDER TOGETHER 12 WITH THE PAPER IN WHICH THE SUMMARY ORDER IS CITED. IF NO COPY IS SERVED BY REASON OF THE 13 AVAILABILITY OF THE ORDER ON SUCH A DATABASE, THE CITATION MUST INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THAT 14 DATABASE AND THE DOCKET NUMBER OF THE CASE IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS ENTERED.

16 17	At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the $4^{\rm th}$ day of May, two thousand seven.
	PRESENT:

20	HON. AMALYA L. KEARSE,
21	HON. ROBERT D. SACK,
22	<u>Circuit Judges</u> ,
23	HON. RICHARD MILLS,
24	<u>District Judge.</u> *
	,
25	
26	DISTRICT COUNCIL 1707, AMERICAN
27	FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, and
28	MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL
29	205,
30	<u>Plaintiffs-Appellees</u> ,
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No. 06-0325-cv

31 - v -

32 HOPE DAY NURSERY, INC.,

33 Defendant-Appellant.

^{*}The Honorable Richard Mills, of the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 Appearing for Appellant: Lendsey H. Jones, New York, NY.

3 Appearing for Appellees: Thomas M. Murray, Kennedy, Jennik, & Murray, New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Richard M. Berman, <u>Judge</u>).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be, and it hereby is, AFFIRMED.

Hope Day Nursery, Inc., appeals from a January 5, 2006 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granting the plaintiffs' motion to confirm and denying the defendant's cross-motion to vacate two arbitration awards that (1) reinstated a discharged employee with back pay; and (2) instructed Hope Day Nursery to "cease and desist from hiring and/or assigning substitute teachers to work extra hours" before first offering those hours to qualified existing employees. We assume the parties' and counsel's familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.

The district court properly found that Hope Day Nursery's challenge to the first arbitration award was untimely. "[G]rounds for vacating an arbitration award may not be raised as an affirmative defense after the period provided in the appropriate statute of limitations governing applications to vacate an arbitration award has lapsed (in New York's case, ninety days)." Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater New York v. Parker Meridien Hotel, 145 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1998). The first arbitration award, dated January 20, 2005, was delivered to Hope Day Nursery by the American Arbitration Association "on or about January 26, 2005." <u>District Council</u> 1707 v. Hope Day Nursery, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 3642 (RMB), 2006 WL 17791, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006). Hope Day Nursery was therefore required to file its motion to vacate by April 26, 2005. Thus, its June 9, 2005 motion to vacate was untimely.

Hope Day Nursery challenges the second arbitration award as "a clear violation of the public policy of the State of New York." (Hope Day Nursery brief on appeal at 9.) While a court may "refus[e] to enforce an arbitrator's award under a collective-bargaining agreement because it is contrary to public policy," such a refusal "is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy

Т	that is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by
2	reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general
3	considerations of supposed public interests." <u>United</u>
4	Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,
5	42-43 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hope Day
6	Nursery has not pointed to a "well defined and dominant" public
7	policy that would be violated by enforcement of the collective
8	bargaining agreement's requirement that Hope Day Nursery offer
9	any extra work to "qualified, permanent, part-time employees"
10	before offering the work to substitute teachers.

We note that Hope Day Nursery's appeal is arguably moot, inasmuch as it conceded at oral argument that it no longer exists as a corporate entity. In light of the fact that the record is silent as to defendant's current status either as a corporate entity or as a contractor for the City of New York, however, we decline to rest our decision on mootness grounds.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT:
THOMAS ASREEN, Acting Clerk of the Court

By: Oliva M. George, Deputy Clerk